2017年考研英语翻译题最新模拟题(四)

　　the animal rights philosophy does not necessarily maintain that human and non-human animals are equal. for example, animal rights advocates do not call for voting rights for chickens. (47) some also would make a distinction between sentient or self-aware animals and lower life forms, with the belief that only animals with self-awareness should be afforded the right to possess their own lives and bodies, without regard to how they are valued by humans. others would extend this right to all animals, even those without developed nervous systems or consciousness. (48) they maintain that any human or human institutions thatmoditizes animals for food, entertainment, clothing, scientific testing, or for any other purpose, infringes upon their fundamental rights to possess themselves and to pursue their own ends, which, therefore, is hical.

　　of course, this argument assumes that a particular species or individual animal is capable of “having ends” which it is capable of “pursuing” in any meaningful manner. few people would deny that other great apes are highly cognitive animals who can reflect on their own condition and goals and can be frustrated when their freedoms are severely curtailed. in contrast, many other animals, like jelly fish, have only extremely simple nervous systems, and are little more than simple automata, capable only of simple reflexes but incapable of formulating any “ends to their actions” or “plans to pursue” them, and equally unable to notice whether they are in captivity or free. (49) by the criteria that biologists use, jelly fish are undeniably animals, while from an “animal rights” perspective, it is questionable whether they should not rather be considered “vege推荐s”. clearly, merely being alive is not enough to be accorded “rights”, as no one has yet seriously proposed that plants should be accorded rights (even though some plants are clearly worthy of protection, but that is another matter). (50) there is as yet no consensus with regards to which qualities make a living organism an “animal in the animal rights sense”.