other observers link high japanese productivity to higher levels of capital investment per worker. but a historical perspective leads to a different conclusion. (48) when the two top japanese automobile makers matched and then doubled united states productivity levels in the mid-sixties, capital investment per employee wasparable to that of united states firms. furthermore, by the late seventies, the amount of fixed assets required to produce one vehicle was roughly equivalent in japan and in the united states. since capital investment was not higher in japan, it had to be other factors that led to higher productivity.
a more fruitful explanation may lie with japanese production techniques. japanese automobile producers did not simply implement conventional processes more effectively, they made critical change in united states procedures. (49) for instance, the mass-production philosophy of united states automakers encouraged the production of huge lots of cars in order to utilize fully expensive,ponent-specific equipment and to occupy fully workers who have been trained to execute one operation efficiently. japanese automakers chose to make small-lot production feasible by introducing several departures from united states practices, including the use of flexible equipment that could be altered easily to do several different production tasks and the training of workers in multiple jobs. (50) automakers could schedule the production of differentponents or models on single machines, thereby eliminating the need to store the spare stocks of extraponents that result when specialized equipment and workers are kept constantly active.
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46. 一些日本观察家认为，尽管日本公司使用与美国公司一样的制造设备和工艺方法，但却由于日本雇员和日本文化的独有特征而受益匪浅。
47. 设在美国并雇用当地工人的由日本人开办的汽车厂，与美国公司拥有的汽车厂相比，其生产效率要高得多。
48. 20世纪60年代中期，两家最大的日本汽车制造商开始与美国的生产效率并驾齐驱，而后来则为美国生产效率的两倍，而每位员工计算的资金投入却与美国不相上下。
49. 例如，美国汽车制造商的规模生产的经营方针鼓励大量生产汽车，以便充分利用价格昂贵的零件专用设备并使受过培训、高效操作某一生产程序的工人不停的干活。
50. 汽车工人能够在一台机器上安排生产不同零件或不同型号的部件，这样就不必额外储存部件作为备用件，而当专用设备和专业工人不停的工作时，就必须有这种备用件的储存。
2.问题在于：这种结果是不是转让过程中不可避免的、固有的；是不是仅仅反映了资源的缺乏和管理不当。
3.这种殖**义方式不考虑其发展过程是否能被“技术转让”接受国的人们执行。“技术转让”始于培训，终于应用，其哲学基础是由制度化的科学结构内的一整套社会文化和经济所决定的价值观所构成的。这些价值观选择那些被认为有意义的问题，决定优先的研究计划，评估所取得的成果的意义。
4.这种情况必须用一种新的方法予以取代，作为发展中国家前沿科学发展的一部分。这种方法即所谓的“基础知识转让”。
5.内部的“技术转让”要求每个国家或地区有一定数量的训练有素的科学家；每个国家和地区都需要创造方式，以保持带头人能始终胜任工作。
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